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Abstract: The United States’ involvement with the Korean peninsula and especially with the 
D.P.R.K. has always oscillated between extremes and as such, Washington has been using a 
variety of policies ranging from engagement to threats in order to try to steer North Korea out of 
a roguish path. The common stereotype regarding such foreign policy is that the Bush 
Administration has had a tendency to sanction North Korea while the previous Administration 
led by President Clinton had a softer, dovish and carrot-driven approach. As North Korea is now 
a nuclear power, it seems important to investigate whether sanctions and rewards have ever 
triggered any change in North Korean behavior, or whether incentives and disincentives have 
largely been ignored by Pyongyang. The literature on how to deal with North Korea clearly 
shows that there is a need to be involved with Pyongyang, but pessimism often prevail as some, 
argue that American sanctions have been rather ineffective as both China and South Korea have 
been helping North Korea financially and thus offset the sanctions’ effects. However, others  
state that it is “unrealistic to assume that an agreement with the D.P.R.K. leadership could be 
reached without giving the country any assurances that it could continue to exist” As such, 
conducting a review of American foreign policy actions toward North Korea has serious 
implications for learning how to deal with a nuclear North Korea, especially in light of the 
upcoming American Presidential election.  
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Introduction 
 
 As George Bush’s last few months in office can almost be counted with the digit of a 
single hand, it is the President’s foreign policy, and especially how he articulated the ‘War on 
Terror’ doctrine as well as implemented regime change that will most likely stay as 
remembrance of his time in office. The Bush Administration has thus attempted to alleviate 
insecurities created by dangerous, or ‘rogue’ states such as Iraq. The 2002 Axis of Evil also 
singled out Iran as well as North Korea, as nations whose designs were contrary to American and 
the free world’s ideals. But even though harsh rhetoric has been used by the Administration in 
order to deal with Pyongyang, many overtures have also been made, and a multilateral forum, the 
Six-Party Talks, has almost constantly been working on the issue of denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula since its first round in 2003. It is not the first time, however, that North Korea 
has been engaged by the United States, and at the same time sanctioned because of its 
development of weapons, or testing, for example. Indeed, the Clinton Administration, though it 
favored Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement, also juggled between sanctions and 
rewards when it came to North Korea. As the presidential election is just around the corner, 
candidates have been presenting different visions of how a foreign policy toward North Korea 
should be conducted. While Barack Obama has been ‘endorsed’ by the Chosen Shinbo1 and has 
hinted that talks with dangerous actors were often necessary, John McCain’s approach is more 
skeptical of president-to-president meeting. 
 
 What foreign policy has the United States conducted toward North Korea during the 
Clinton and the Bush Administrations? Where sanctions and rewards effective in swaying 
Pyongyang’s resolve to develop nuclear weapons, and what type of policies should not be 
enacted, as North Korea has detonated a nuclear weapon while still participating in the process of  
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? 
 
 In order to answer those questions, it is necessary to examine how North Korea has been 
framed and engaged by the United States. As such, the United States has been crafting a foreign 
policy toward North Korea that must acknowledge the existence of very specific variables: first, 
North Korea has been framed as a rogue state in an extensive fashion, and Washington has been 
oscillating between engagement and containment, as well as sometimes regime change and 
rollback strategies. Moreover, Washington has had to consider North Korea’s immediate 
surroundings, and therefore its geopolitical importance, which is also directly influencing the 
relevance of the United States military in the region. Finally, the United States has had to 
compose with North Korea development of its nuclear program and as such, negotiations 
regarding Pyongyang’s armament have constituted an important part of the relationship between 
the two countries.  
 
 This paper will therefore first look at how North Korea has been understood in an 
American context, and it will investigate the notion that Pyongyang is a rogue state. Second, the 
paper will consider whether and how a rogue state such as North Korea can and has been 
engaged by the United States. Finally, an analysis of negotiation rounds since Kim Jong Il’s 
accession to power in 1994, as well as the United States’ foreign policy outside of those rounds 
of negotiation will be presented.  
                                                
1 World Tribune, “Obama Offers Change Kim Jong-Il Can Believe In,” Friday, June 20, 2008.  
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I. Framing North Korea into a Contemporary American Context 
 
 
The Concept of ‘Rogue State’ 
 
Over the past two decades, North Korea has often been referred to as being a “rogue 
state”. Interestingly, however, the literature does not have a fixed definition for what a rogue 
state is. The term was created and used mainly by the United States. One can trace the 
appearance of the concept of “rogue state” back to the Clinton years, when it was first used to 
talk about the clear danger that Iran and Libya presented to Europe. The first commonly accepted 
definition of the term is often attributed to Anthony Lake, then Assistant Secretary for National 
Security Affairs under President Clinton, and who defined rogue states as “nations that exhibit a 
chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world” (1994). This definition was 
then modified to fit various other situations, such as when Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
attempted to justify the United States’ steps toward creating and deploying a limited missile 
defense system. Later on, Madeleine Albright also talked about rogues, but using the somewhat 
milder “states of concern” label (Becker 2005). The term “rogue” became once more fashionable 
when President G. W. Bush came to power. Michael Klare also traces the rise of the modern 
“American rogue doctrine” to the late 1980’s, when the United States started linking together the 
notion of rogue states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and problems of instability 
usually occurring in third world countries (1995). This linkage is also found in Jasper Becker’s 
definition of rogue states as being not only unstable and aggressive, but typically failed states 
(2005). 
 
 How do rogue states fit within the United States understanding of its own foreign policy? 
At first, rogue states were seen as isolationists and Lake initially understood them as states that 
were also consciously isolated from the international community. Over the past fifteen years, 
however, the definition has shifted to encompass many different aspects of a state’s behavior, 
while still being largely focused on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In his book 
Rogue Regime, Jasper Becker ties the notion of the rogue label to a pursuit of weapons such as 
nuclear bombs and to a “dangerous insanity in the diplomatic world” that would also mean the 
lack of understanding of the concept of deterrence (2005) while Lake’s definition of a rogue state 
only amounted to that of a marginalized state, or a state that does not function within the open 
limits of the international system. But this definition is too simplistic to fit the case of North 
Korea, as Pyongyang has been a member of the United Nations since 1991 and has been 
interacting with other states on a fairly regular basis, especially with the former Soviet Union and 
the People’s Republic of China.  
 
Robert Litwak’s work on rogue regime presents another definition that stresses the fact 
that contemporary concerns are now very different from when a Nazi Germany or a Soviet 
Union were threatening to upset the balance of power within the system (2000). Litwak contends 
that the focus is now on relatively marginalized states that could threaten the stability of their 
immediate region, but that do not pose a risk to the larger international system. This definition 
does not fit the case of North Korea either, however. Instability within the region would most 
likely spill over and upset the international system, since North Korea’s neighbors are amongst 
some of the most powerful nations in the world, as well as major United States’ trading partners.  
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Litwak’s definition can, however, be complemented by that of Alexander George. George 
suggests that rogue states fall into a specific political category that is used by great powers who 
have a stake at maintaining a specific organization and order within the international system 
(1993). George argues that the concept of rogue states did not arise from any international legal 
tradition, but rather that it was constructed by American politics. George’s position is supported 
by the fact that the United States started as early as 1979 to develop a list of terrorist and outlaw 
states. Importantly, this list is not recognized by the United Nations nor is it recognized by any 
body of international law.  
 
 Following George’s logic, the United States is partly responsible for singling out North 
Korea and characterizing it as a rogue. It is also interesting to note George’s argument-building 
process: he mentions that during the 1970’s, the United States had developed a list of 
diplomatically isolated states that had interest in developing nuclear weapons. South Korea was 
then part of this list! This reflected the tense relationship between Seoul and Washington and 
Jimmy Carter’s displeasure with South Korea president Park Chung-Hee’s policies which were 
raising concerns about human rights in South Korean, and how Seoul becoming a democracy 
was not necessarily a given, despite the United States’ effort to support the country since the 
partition of the Koreas in the 1950s.   
 
One of the important aspects of the North Korean - American relationship is the link that 
Pyongyang has had with terrorism. North Korea’s slot on the United States State Department’s 
list of nations that provide a safe haven for terrorists or that are engaged in terrorist activities 
themselves has been a constant haggle between Washington and Pyongyang and regularly 
resurfaces as a contentious topic between the two. North Korea earned its slot on the list as it is 
responsible for the 1983 Rangoon bombing (during which South Korean President Chun Doo 
Hwan narrowly escaped death while on an official state visit to Burma) and the 1987 bombing of 
Korean Airline flight 858 (Oberdorfer 2002). However, it is problematic to label a state “rogue”, 
“terrorist” or “pariah” since, as Robert Litwak contends, such labeling will “push the United 
States’ Administration toward a default strategy of containment and isolation” (2000).  
 
Whether to engage North Korea or to try to contain it without interacting much with 
Pyongyang has been a dilemma for the United States. This problem was very salient during the 
Clinton Administration, as it was the first American Administration to attempt to engage North 
Korea at a different level. The Clinton Administration tried to use confidence-building measures 
(understood here as actions taken by various parties involved in a conflict and which are geared 
toward reducing tension and providing a sense of security), such as the 1994 Agreed Framework 
to promote stability on the Korean peninsula. Litwak contends that although the Clinton 
Administration adopted a one-size-fits-all approach to so-called “rogue states,” North Korea was 
excluded from this strategy. Washington kept on trying to engage North Korea despite the fact 
that many thought North Korea was not respecting the rules it has agreed on in Geneva in 1994. 
North Korea has also been treated differently than other “rogue states” by the G. W. Bush 
Administration. The Bush Administration has not tried to pursue regime change in North Korea 
the way it did in Iraq even though it has been clearly established that North Korea possessed 
weapons of mass destruction (2000).  
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Finally, an important refinement has been added to the concept of rogue states, especially 
in the post-9/11 world order: the United States has shifted its focus almost exclusively toward 
terrorists, state-sponsored terrorism and states engaged in trading weapons of mass destruction to 
non-state actors, such as isolated insurgency groups. Henriksen argues that this change started to 
happen at the end of the Cold War. He discusses the link rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, 
Iran and Libya have with terrorism (1999). Advocating the fact that the United States must take 
the lead in confronting rogue governments, he supports the use of sanctions and the pursuit of 
isolationist policies to contain rogue states. Moreover, he argues for the use of international 
courts and domestic prosecution, as well as for the use of armed interventions to bring rogues 
down. 
 
To summarize, the literature tells us that the definition of rogue states has evolved over 
time. At first, rogues were defined as states that did not fit into a traditional pattern of regular 
interactions with other states. Rogues have also been associated with weapons of mass 
destruction and especially with the pursuit of nuclear power. The concept of rogue has also been 
extended in order to incorporate marginalized states, as well as those states that can threaten the 
stability of a given region. However, the rogue definition also depends on who is doing the 
defining: great powers have had a stake in deciding which states fit the rogue definition, based 
on how such states would influence the balance of power.  North Korea therefore falls into the 
categories of isolationist and unstable states desiring non-conventional weapons. However, 
Washington is now in a difficult position, as it appears it has created its own monster, just as Dr. 
Frankenstein had: the United States has labeled North Korea a rogue state, but has not treated it 
as such. Instead, the United States has been engaged in negotiations with the North even though 
Washington does not recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s official existence. 
The United States is therefore stuck in a conundrum: even though it does not want to interact 
with North Korea, isolating Pyongyang is no longer possible now that Kim Jong Il has testing its 
own nuclear weapon. Invading the North, on the other hand, does not seem possible especially in 
light of the United States’ current engagement in Iraq as well as for obvious tactical and practical 
military reasons such as those underlined by Michael O’Hanlon’s who notices the lack of any 
open or easy access to Pyongyang thus pointing at a major geographical contrast between North 
Korea and the open desert that surrounds Baghdad (2005).  
 
 
Assessing the Threat 
 
 Has North Korea been engaged despite being a rogue because is it, in fact, not a real 
threat to the United States but more of a “looming threat” as Becker contends (2005)? Is the fact 
that Pyongyang insists on developing its own viable nuclear weapons a factor in Washington’s 
war on terrorism? Or is North Korea an embarrassing problem for the Bush Administration, as 
the United States is having a difficult time negotiating a secure deal with Pyongyang, and is also 
militarily overextended in several regions because of the recent Iraq military intervention?  
 
There are thus three broad lines of thought to consider when analyzing the current level 
of threat that North Korea projects: the possibility of military confrontation, instability in the 
East Asian region, and a political threat to Washington.  
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 The most obvious form of threat from North Korea is the possibility of an armed conflict 
over the Korean peninsula. Also possible is the ignition of a conflict that would sweep across 
Northeast Asia. Because the Pyongyang regime’s hold over the country has not weakened 
despite the change in leadership in 1994, its problems associated with the failed Agreed 
Framework, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is not a harmless state. However, it 
should be noted that a Manichean approach to international relations often does not provide 
accurate and unbiased views. If North Korea is in possession of atomic bombs as its 2006 testing 
seem to imply, the purpose may not be to use these weapons to destroy South Korea or Japan. 
The North Korean regime, although it sometimes shows erratic behavior when taking decisions, 
exhibits an inner rationality. Pyongyang’s main objective is state survival. This explains its 
desire to have deterrent nuclear weapons, or weapons powerful enough to defend itself in case of 
aggression (Kang 2005). Kim Jong-Il probably knows that any North Korean attack on South 
Korea would trigger an American response, which would most likely be lethal for North Korea, 
and its regime. The strong American presence in the Demilitarized Zone may also be interpreted 
by Pyongyang as a threat from Washington. 
 
 There is also the possibility, however unlikely, that a conflict could be triggered by the 
United States.  George W. Bush trapped in his own preemptive doctrine, and the War on 
Terrorism motto, and striving to be coherent could strike first if North Korea somehow 
convinced Washington it was a real and immediate danger to the United States’ national security. 
Washington’s willingness to prevent terrorism from spreading and to monitor regimes 
responsible for building and trading weapons of mass destruction is pushing the American 
government to act on many fronts. It is then legitimate to wonder whether North Korea might be 
the next target after Iraq. Should the United States intervene in North Korea, Northeast Asia’s 
stability would be greatly affected, partly because of Seoul’s un-readiness to accommodate North 
Korean refugees, but also because of the new role the United States would have to play in 
winning the peace over the peninsula. Post-war reconstruction and state-building would also 
prove to be very complex and costly for regional powers as well as for Washington.  
 
Because of the nature of the North Korean regime as well as the historical events that led 
to the division of the country, Pyongyang has been seen as an aggressive nation that tests 
missiles over Japan, bombs commercial aircrafts, purchases military arsenal from Middle Eastern 
countries and often refuses to participate in international forums with other nations. Is North 
Korea an aggressive state because of the nature of its leadership, or does acquiring nuclear 
weapons as a nuclear deterrent make sense for Kim Jong-Il? Experts sharply differ in their views 
of Pyongyang’s militarism and aggressiveness.  
 
 Victor Cha, in Lee’s vein, supports the idea that North Korea’s goal has changed from 
achieving hegemonic unification to avoiding collapse and domination by the South (2003). Cha 
argues, however, that the change of strategy regarding long-term goals is exactly what might lead 
Pyongyang to try a preemptive-type of action toward the South:  “each provocation is too minor 
to prompt all-out war, but serious enough to raise the incentive for Seoul and Washington to give 
ground and negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis.” The assessment that North Korea 
cannot be completely trusted to be deterred is especially important in light of North Korean 
military development, and many also argue about the real orientation that Pyongyang has been 
taking since Kim Jong-Il came to power, and following the devastating floods and droughts of 
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the mid-1990’s. Paul French argues that since 2003 there seems to have been a change in 
Pyongyang’s priority regarding potential economic reforms and diplomatic engagement; North 
Korea has started to reassert its military first-line policy (2005). Other experts contend that North 
Korea’s behavior stems from its economic needs; North Korea, nearing the state of economic 
collapse, has become more aggressive. They suggest that creating economic incentives for North 
Korea to accept a denuclearization bargain with Washington could be a potential solution to the 
uncertain situation (O’Hanlon 2003) and Paul French claims that North Korea’s food shortage 
situation could be resolved by simply reducing its defense budget by five percent (2005).  
 
 Others hold a more liberal view than the more realist perspective of Victor Cha. David 
Kang, for example, asserts that the concept of deterrence is understood and respected by North 
Korea (2003). Kang argues that North Korea also understands that nuclear weapons are political 
weapons and should not be used as offensive arms, and that Kim Jong-Il is essentially a rational 
thinker. One could, however, make a logical argument based on historical events on the 
peninsula that North Korea militarized and isolated itself in order to survive, and does not have 
many options in light of the united States’ military presence in the region, and its role bolstering 
South Korea’s security while being one of its most important trading partners. The United States 
and the international community are divided in their thinking about how to best deal with North 
Korea. Cha presents an approach that he dubs as “hawk and dove” engagement (2003). Stating in 
a convincing manner that North Korea does not belong to the Axis of Evil, Cha moves on to state 
that Kim Jong-Il operates under a rational and calculating framework, he rejects  criticisms about 
Kim’s supposedly crazy and impossible-to-deter nature.  For him, Pyongyang has the capability 
to launch an attack on the South, and to smuggle weapons in Japan but has not done so, thus 
proving that North Korea has been deterred. However, he is also cautious in assessing 
Pyongyang’s regime as he notes that North Korea has often defected from international 
agreements. Framing the current debates in American foreign policy in terms of Hawks and 
Dove, Cha supports the claim that the Clinton Administration managed to delay North Korean 
atomic development, even though it did not manage to stop it.  
 
 But perhaps one of the most direct threats to the United States is the relative position of 
its military within East Asia. The important number of U.S. soldiers dispatched over South 
Korea, and largely in Asia as well as their security is of prime importance to the United States. 
Removing troops is not an option, as the possibility of an attack from North Korea to South 
Korea, and possibly Japan is still a reality, though not a strong possibility as such attack would 
most likely be swept away by an American retaliatory strike over North Korea. However, 
damages the United States army could suffer if there was a military confrontation would 
probably be smaller in comparison to the whirlpool, which would sweep Asia, and by 
repercussion the rest of the world. Because of the strong economic ties the United States has with 
Japan, as well as the economic importance of Asia, the world’s stability depends in large part on 
a peaceful situation in East Asia. It is therefore possible that the United States’ interest is to 
prolong its presence within East Asia, by maintaining a status-quo. Of course, such a situation 
does not resolve the threat posed by North Korea’s military capabilities, but at the same time, 
limiting the risks of a confrontation and still continuing a distant engagement policy towards 
North Korea is the only known option that has worked before, and that did not lead to a major 
crisis. 
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 Finally, a direct attack from North Korea to any facilities in the South, in Japan, or in the 
sea bordering the Korean peninsula could trigger a military response from the United States, but 
as seen before, a deliberate attack from Pyongyang seems less than probable, providing that the 
North Korean regime understand the logic of nuclear deterrence as well as legitimate retaliation, 
similar to that of the United Nations upon Pyongyang’s invasion of the South in 1951. However, 
the United States’ military forces could be put at risk in the event of a mishandling of nuclear 
weapons, or weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. The risk associated with building arms 
stocks is that some weapons might end up in the wrong hands, or the mere fabrication process 
could lead to serious consequences if an accident happened. Because of North Korea’s poor 
economy, it seems hardly conceivable that its weapon-building facilities would include state-of-
the-art machineries and security devices. The risk of a nuclear accident in Northeast Asia exists, 
and is also somewhat of a concern, if not a threat to American troops in the region, and to the 
world’s stability as well.  
 
 North Korea has thus managed to create a brinkmanship system with many countries 
around the world, but especially with the United States. One of George W. Bush’s campaign 
messages was his willingness to restore America’s pride abroad. However, as his presidency 
nears its end, the Middle East, Europe, as well as Asia hold many anti-American views. This also 
applies to South Korea, where frequent protests are being organized in order to denounce Bush’s 
erratic foreign policy towards North Korea. Cha’s analysis of what he refers to as the Hawk 
policy is quite compelling, and demonstrates the rational behind what seemed to be a series of 
unbalanced political maneuvers (2002). George Bush’s Axis of Evil discourse showed a 
departure from the Clinton Administration’s engagement policy, despite Bush’s claims that he 
would follows most of Clinton’s line towards Pyongyang. The new policy also seems strangely 
opposed to the recommendations given in the 1999 Perry report, which was commended by the 
U.S. Administration, and resulted in a yearlong investigation of North Korea and its relationship 
with the United States. The Perry report warned about the terrible consequences a military 
conflict over the peninsula would create, despite America’s most likely victory. It stressed the 
importance of dialogue with Pyongyang as well as the importance of completing the Agreed 
Framework. It also delineated cooperation with South Korea and Japan as being of uttermost 
importance in dealing with the North Korean situation (Perry 1999).  
 
 George W. Bush has faced tough challenges when trying to apply a consistent approach 
to North Korea and so will his successor. According to Cha’s analysis, Washington’s attempt to 
transform carrots into sticks is a compelling approach and could not have been attempted before 
the Clinton Administration, as no relationship had previously been initiated between the United 
States and North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship is a political threat or a security to 
the Bush Administration and thus the Administration seemed to have tried to counter this threat, 
no matter its real nature. 
 
 Moreover, North Korea as a weapons provider poses an integral threat to the United 
States as well. The interception of weapons shipments from Pyongyang to Yemen suggests that 
North Korea’s economy is extremely reliant on its military exports. Selling weapons of mass 
destruction to other rogue states could make North Korea an accomplice of terrorism, therefore 
giving reasons for the United States to eliminate such practices. 
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II. Is it possible to engage a roguish North Korea? 
 
 
To Engage or Not to Engage 
 
 The United States has over time been involved into two types of interactions with North 
Korea: negotiations through bilateral and multilateral forum, and ongoing meeting / rhetorical 
exchanges. But directly negotiating or even communicating with North Korea is controversial for 
the United States as Washington does not consider North Korea as a legitimate actor in the 
international system. What is the danger for the United States to talk to such a ‘villain’? Bertram 
Spector argues that the inherent risk in negotiating with terrorists and with rogue states is smaller 
than pursuing a no-negotiation policy (1998). He also focuses on the need to address terrorists 
and rogues' interests and intentions in order to find out whether there might be reasonable 
grounds to enter into negotiations. His approach thus departs from a zero-sum approach and 
leans towards a more cooperative, enlarging-the-pie approach. This proposition is also sponsored 
by Abba Eban, who argues that leaders have a duty to negotiate with villains, no matter how 
detestable they are, as leaders might be saving lives by doing so (1998). Roger Fisher, William 
Ury and Bruce Patton also advocate talking and negotiating with villains not for ethical reasons, 
but because this is the only peaceful available solution to change a status quo (1991).  
 
But what kind of actor has North Korea been when engaged by the international 
community? Some advocate that it is almost impossible to deal with North Korea as an isolated 
player, because of its relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Triplett, for example, 
considers North Korea a subordinate of China and which is part, to some extent, of the Chinese 
Communist empire (2004). Bordering along the lines of conspiracy theory, Triplett talks about 
China using a “borrowed knife,” as it bolsters the North Korean regime by giving it support and 
money, and in turns receives benefits from North Korea’s defiant actions toward the United 
States and the international community, while appearing as a broker and reliant actor in the 
international system.  Others such as You Ji look closely at the relationship between China and 
North Korea over the past fifty years and conclude that Beijing and China have had less and less 
to agree upon overtime, and have had rather contentious points of view when it came to their 
historical ties as well as their economic and diplomatic relations (2001). Finally, some have 
argued that China has played a constructive role in the current stalemate, as it has behaved as a 
honest broker between the United States and North Korea and that Beijing is to be credited for 
Pyongyang’s return to the negotiation table in 2003 even after the failure of the Agreed 
Framework (Wu 2005). At the same time, there is a divide in the literature regarding who 
deserves the blame for this failure and the current stalling of more recent rounds of talks. Some 
of the most influential and knowledgeable researchers on North Korea such as Leon Sigal, Selig 
Harrison, and Bruce Cumings blame Washington for the failure of the Agreed Framework, while 
others, such as Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board for the Bush 
Administration, thinks that North Korea blackmailed the United States before, during, and after 
the Agreed Framework negotiations (2003). The answer to the question of who is to blame, 
however, remains often tied to political affiliations, especially in the United States as many are 
still polarized by different approaches taken by the Clinton and Bush Administrations on the 
North Korean issue.  
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Thus, there is a division within the literature as to whether or not rogues such as North 
Korea should be engaged. Ignoring North Korea, however, is a risky solution that the United 
States is no longer willing to consider. From 2000 to 2003, the United States has refused to be 
involved in talks with North Korea mainly because Washington was preoccupied by the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, the war in Afghanistan as well as the war in Iraq. China has 
acted as a middleman, effectively bringing back both Washington and Pyongyang to the 
negotiation table in April 2003. During those talks, North Korea stated it had developed nuclear 
weapons, and this revelation turned out to be a wake-up call for the United States. Washington 
realized that it could not longer ignore North Korea for large period of times, as Pyongyang’s 
actions would go unchecked, and could possibly upset the balance of power in Northeast Asia as 
well as around the world. Engagement with North Korea is thus needed, as Michael Klare had 
prescribed back in 1995: containing and confronting rogue states only heighten their resolves, 
whereas engaging them could be more successful (1995).  
 
 
Engagement in Practice 
 
 Since Kim Jong-Il came to power in 1994, North Korea and the United States have been 
involved in a number of high-profile negotiation episodes as well as dialogues despite 
Washington’s policy of non-recognition towards Pyongyang.  It is possible to divide this time 
period into three eras that each exhibit specific characteristics. 
 
 
1. Teenage Diplomacy 
 
The first phase can be labeled “Teenage Diplomacy.” It took place as soon as Kim Jong-
Il came to power and is illustrated by the first and only crisis negotiation case in the time-period. 
First, the “Pilot Negotiations” case took place in late 1994. A U.S. Army helicopter crossed the 
D.M.Z and entered into North Korea’s air space. The helicopter was shot down by the North 
Korean Army. The United States government had to negotiate with North Korea in order to 
recover the remains of one pilot who died, and to obtain the release of the second pilot. The case 
is noteworthy since it was important that it did not intensify so as to not impede the 
implementation of the Agreed Framework that had just been signed a few months before this 
incident. This case opened the way for the world to see whether or not Kim Jong-Il had managed 
to succeed his father. The two countries also held negotiations and dialogue during the “Nodong 
Launch” crisis. Talks took place in 1996 when the United States detected North Korean 
preparations for a test of its medium-range Nodong missile.  Washington tried to assert its power 
by sending reconnaissance ships and aircrafts to Japan. Several meetings were held in New York 
between the United States and North Korea, in order to reach a compromise on the missile 
testing.  
 
 
2. Tentative Diplomacy 
 
The second phase that can be labeled “Tentative Diplomacy” started in 1996 and ended in 
2000. This phase was characterized by tense relationships over the Korean peninsula because of 
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the 1996 incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters, North Korea’s 
difficulties overcoming its food crisis, and numerous floods and droughts. The Four-Party Talks 
that also took place during this period showed the importance of monetary compensations: North 
Korea used early rounds of negotiation to receive money for its participation in the talks. 
Washington and Pyongyang held bilateral missile talks eight times from 1996 to 2000. The 
United States and North Korea also held bilateral talks in Berlin in April 1996 in order to discuss 
Pyongyang’s missile proliferation. North Korea was asked to agree to the Missile Technology 
Control Regime and responded by asking for compensation from the United States for lost 
missile-related revenues. Subsequent talks took place in Berlin in June 1997 (Round 2), in New 
York in October 1998 (Round 3), in Pyongyang in March 1999 (Round 4), in Berlin in 
September 1999 (Round 5), in Rome in May 2000 (Round 6), and in Kuala Lumpur both in July 
and in November 2000 (Round 7 and 8). Additional talks also took place in 1998 and 1999 for 
the “Kumchang-ri Compromise”, and involved a potentially hazardous construction on a North 
Korean site. American Ambassador to South Korea Charles Kartman visited the D.P.R.K. and 
exposed his concerns regarding underground construction in the Yongbyon area. If North Korea 
was indeed building a nuclear plant at Kumchang-ri, the 1994 Agreed Framework could be 
voided. Pyongyang had to decide, in order to receive food and aid, whether it would allow 
American inspectors to visit the site. At the same time, the Four-Part Talks started to signal a 
tentative shift toward multilateral diplomacy: the United States, China, South Korea and North 
Korea met in Geneva in December 1997 in an unprecedented move, in order to discuss security 
issues and a nuclear-free peninsula. Subsequent rounds took place in March 1998 (Round 2), 
October 1998 (Round 3), January 1999 (Round 4), April 1999 (Round 5) and August 1999 
(Round 6).  
 
1998 and 1999 showed an increase in the amount of contacts with North Korea, and 
reflected the interest that North Korea had for the Clinton Administration. Madeleine Albright’s 
2000 visit to North Korea was meant to pave the way for a potential Clinton visit before the end 
of his term.2 Albright’s visit was also part of a succession of events that were tied to the failure 
of the Bilateral Missile Talks. According to Donald Gregg  who was then working for the 
Council on Foreign Relations, it was concluded that the missile crisis was risking the United 
States’ relationship with North Korea, and the C.F.R. asked that a high diplomat be selected to be 
sent to North Korea in order to help the issue move forward.3 As a result, William Perry was sent 
to Pyongyang and though he did not meet with Kim Jong-Il, he managed to develop a 
relationship with his North Korean counterpart that was strong enough to incite that General 
Politburo Director Cho Myong-Nok be sent to Washington to carry an invitation for President 
Clinton to visit North Korea.4  
 
 
3. Multilateral Diplomacy 
 
The 2000 Inter-Korea summit meeting was the most important reconciliation event that 
the two Koreas had taken part in since the division of the peninsula, but also coincided with a 
change of leadership in Washington D.C., as President Bush entered the White House. For many, 
                                                
2 Interview with Donald Gregg, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2006). Washington D.C. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Green, M., Council on Foreign Relations (2006). Washington D.C. 
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the Clinton-Kim Dae-Jung years were the most successful in terms of diplomacy.  The first 
democratic government in South Korea did not constrain Washington as much as earlier regimes 
had5 since previous regimes could be considered as being more authoritarian (such as the Park 
regime that had many diverging views from the Carter Administration, especially regarding 
human rights). That window of opportunity, however, ended with September 11, 2001.  In 
comparison with 2000, 2001 and 2002 showed a dearth in the relationship between the United 
States and North Korea, mostly because of the terrorist attacks and President G. W. Bush’s Axis 
of Evil speech in early 2002.  President Bush’s change in policy towards North Korea, illustrated 
by its decision not to pick up where President Clinton had left off, angered many South Korean 
conservatives, especially as it contradicted Colin Powell’s statements that the Bush policy would 
be no different than that of Clinton. Slowly, the Bush Administration started to show more 
flexibility and when President Bush came to Seoul in 2003, he was eager to arrange talks with 
North Korea.6  
 
Thus, the 2003-2008 period can be labeled a period of “Multilateral Diplomacy.” It was 
characterized by two frameworks that relied heavily on China bringing North Korea to the 
negotiation table.  The monetary bait that was used in the 1990s’ ceased to be a requisite for 
bringing North Korea to negotiate. Because of the war in Iraq and the United States’ 2002 
preemptive strike doctrine, China decided to step to the plate in order to replace the absence of 
American diplomacy towards North Korea.7 Thus, China, North Korea and the United States’ 
met for negotiations in Beijing in April 2003. No significant negotiations had taken place 
between the United States and North Korea since the summer of 1999 when the last round of 
Four-Party Talks was held. Following the change of Administration in the United States as well 
as the September 11 attacks, the Beijing Trilateral Talks were an effort to jumpstart a multilateral 
talk process that had died several years earlier. Thus, because China saw North Korea as a 
potential threat if it collapsed or if it had nuclear weapons, Beijing decided to assume the lead in 
the recent rounds of negotiation, and was largely responsible for bringing North Korea into the 
Six-party framework after the 2003 Trilateral Talks even though North Korea did not want 
anything else than bilateral talks with Washington.8 Another factor also weighed in on North 
Korea’s decision to come back to the Six-Party Talks for a second round without using the tactic 
of negotiating its participation for money: Hu Jintao had to go to the A.P.E.C. meeting in Pusan 
in November 2003, but had never been to North Korea before. Protocol between the two 
communist allies would dictate that Hu would have to go to Pyongyang first before going to 
Pusan. Hu appears to have used this opportunity to negotiate with North Korea.  He first visited 
North Korea before going to South Korea in exchange for North Korea’s promise to come back 
to the Six-Party Talks. 9  The United States, for its part, was happy to have a multilateral 
framework, especially after having been accused of unilateralism against Iraq.10  
 
Finally, China’s role should be highlighted as Beijing was a driving force behind the 
September 19, 2005 agreement, by presenting multiple drafts for parties to sign. After North 
                                                
5 Hubbard, T., Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2005). Washington D.C. 
6 Choi, K., Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Republic of Korea (2006). Seoul. 
7 Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago, 3/18 2006.. 
8 Flake, G., Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (2006). Washington D.C. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago, 3/18 2006. 
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Korea tested its nuclear weapons in early October 2006, President Bush rejected once again calls 
for bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang while Condoleezza Rice tried to build support for 
Asian leaders to help the United States get back on the diplomatic field. The diplomatic process 
seemed to be revitalized when North Korea, following a meeting Beijing with the United States 
appeared ready to join the Six Party Talks again The third phase of the fifth round of the Six-
Party Talks started on February 8, 2007 in Beijing. Bilateral meetings were held ahead of the 
talks by China as well as other by other parties. After the release of North Korean funds from the 
Banco Delta Asia in Macao, North Korea announced on July 14, 2007 that is had closed its 
Yongbyon facility, which was later confirmed by I.A.E.A. inspectors. Subsequent evolution 
during the end of 2007 and the first half of 2008 with new Six-Party Talks discussion in Beijing 
during the summer as well as North Korea destroying part of its Yongbyon reactors in exchange 
for American concessions has not yet led to a comprehensive and clear outcome regarding North 
Korea’s rogue status.  
 
 
 
III. Sanctions, Rewards, and North Korean Reactions 
 
 
In order to assess the United States’ foreign policy choices and its usage of sanctions and 
rewards toward North Korea, it is useful to look at news transcripts as well as official documents 
released by the United States as well as by the United Nations. As such, a content analysis 
method was used to analyze the various negotiation episodes that the United States and North 
Korea have been involved in, and present how North Korea has been responding to such change. 
The study period was from 1994, date at which the leadership changed in North Korea, until 
2007 and the later rounds of Six-Party Talks. A subsequent part also investigates the effects of 
American foreign policy options outside of the realm of negotiation episodes but rather through 
ongoing interactions between Washington and Pyongyang.  
 
 
Foreign Policy within Negotiation Rounds 
 
 First, North Korea has been using “give and take” approaches, here labeled as 
“Conditional Concessions”. North Korea has been using Conditional Concessions numerous 
times, and in all negotiation rounds except for the Pilot Negotiation and the Nodong Launch. It is 
interesting to notice that North Korea has used a significantly larger number of Conditional 
Concessions that any other party involved in the different negotiation rounds, and considerably 
more than the United States, who appears to be using Stances more.  
 
 
  Rounds US NK 
Bilateral R1   Ask U.S. to ease eco. sanctions in 
return for suspension of missile 
development and export 
  Inter   Ask for repatriation of defectors in 
order to come back to negotiation 
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  R3   Requests U.S. grant 1 billion a year 
in return for regulation of missile 
export 
  R4 Will ease eco. sanctions if missile 
program stopped 
Demands $3 billion over three 
years in compensation for stopping 
missile program 
  Inter   Would abandon missile program if 
could be provided satellite 
launchers 
  R8   Will give-up 1,000kms-range 
missile development if U.S. 
launches satellites in China or 
Russia 
Kumchang-ri R1   Asks for $300 million for visit of 
site –  
not Kumchang-ri 
  R2   Offers 2 chances to visit 
Kumchang-ri in exchange for 
400,00 tons of food aid 
Four-Party 
Talks 
    Ask for food aid and lifting of 
trade and investment sanctions as 
pre-conditions to the talks 
      Ask for food aid, American 
diplomatic recognition and easing 
of trade sanctions 
  R2 Wants a permanent peace treaty 
prior to lifting economic embargo 
Will not join new round if US does 
not remove troops from S.K. 
  R6   Will not  come back to talks if 2 
key issues are not included in talks 
Trilateral 
Talks 
    Will abandon nuclear weapons 
programs and will stop exporting 
missiles in exchange of pledge of 
non-aggression from U.S. 
      Package includes security 
guarantees, lifting of econ 
sanctions, provision of food, aid 
from South Korea and Japan, and 
compensation for Japanese 
occupation of Korea 
Six-Party 
Talks 
R1   Will give up nukes in exchange for 
fuel supplies and reactor promised 
by AF (nonaggression, econ aid 
from SK and J as well) 
  R2   Will not agree to N.K.'s request 
unless C.V.I.D. 
  R3   Might allow C.V.I.D. if given 
compensation 
    Offer energy reward for N.K. to 
freeze installation in 3 months 
Wants 2 million tons of energy a 
year, removal from terrorist list, 
and lifting of sanctions 
  Inter   Will come back if respected by the 
U.S. as a regime 
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Second, both the United States and North Korea have been using a “take it or leave it” 
approach, here called “Stances,” by which parties request something without asking for anything 
in return. Stances are less conciliatory than Conditional Concessions. Stances have been used in 
every negotiation episode. 
 
 
  Roun
ds 
US NK 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
  Ask for safe return of pilots Wants to complete its own 
investigation and then will release 
pilot 
    Wants prompt access to alive pilot 
and pilot's remains 
Not finished with investigation and 
not ready to discuss return of Hall 
    Wants immediate release of 
surviving pilot and pilot's remains 
Asks for apology 
    Questioning delay in releasing pilot Says was spying, wants U.S. to send 
higher-ranked diplomat 
      Asks for U.S. to sign apology 
statement 
Missile 
Talks 
R1   Asks U.S. not to publicize talks 
because of internal problem 
    Asks N.K. to hold joint neg. about 
peace treaty 
  
    Wants N.K. to stop exporting 
missiles to Middle East 
  
  R2 Urges restriction of missile 
production 
  
    Asks N.K. to join the Missile 
Technological Control Regime 
  
  R3   Will continue to launch missiles as a 
sovereign right 
Nodong 
Launch 
  Asks N.K. not to carry out ballistic 
missile test 
  
Kumchang-
ri 
  Asks for access to Kumchang-ri site Responds it is a civilian site so no 
need for access 
      Asks Perry not to sanction North 
Korea for something that might not 
be being built 
Four-Party 
Talks 
  Creates 4 party talks Asks for information about 4-way 
talks 
  R1   Asks U.S. to end economic blockage 
and have bilateral talks 
  Inter   Calls for a delay in four-way talks 
      Calls for talks to occur in 
Switzerland instead of in China 
  R2   Wants to raise issue of U.S. troops 
withdrawal 
  Inter   Wants peace agreement with U.S. 
  Inter   Asks for 2-week pushback because 
of Kim Il-Sung's birthday 
      Wants to discuss status of US troops 
during talks 
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  R5   Wants to discuss status of US troops 
during talks 
Trilateral 
Talks 
  Will not reward bad behavior   
Six-Party 
Talks 
R1 No intention of invading Wants U.S. to sign legally binding 
treaty of nonaggression 
    Wants N.K. to dismantle first Wants U.S. to stop intervening in 
N.K. trade 
  Inter   Wants to exclude Japan from talks if 
it raises abduction issue 
      Wants peaceful nuclear program 
      Asks for right to retain nuclear 
energy, and also wants resources 
 
 
 
Third, parties have been using “Threats”, which are unequivocal statements used to 
compel or prevent a party from taking a certain action. The United States has used Threats 
significantly more than North Korea during the negotiation episodes. 
 
 
  Rounds US NK 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
  Failure of N.K. to provide prompt 
information will be detrimental to 
Pyongyang 
Will release pilot only if proven 
that it was a navigational mistake 
    $4 billion A.F. could be in jeopardy 
if crisis continues like this 
  
    Senators: N.K. should cooperate 
otherwise no A.F. 
  
    Not releasing pilot will lead to 
serious consequences 
  
Missile 
Talks 
R3 U.S. warns of very serious 
consequences if N.K. tests or 
exports its missiles 
  
  R4 Will suspend heavy-oil shipment 
and food aid if does not suspend 
missile-firing 
  
Nodong 
Launch 
  K.E.D.O. says tensions on the 
peninsula could have an effect on 
schedule of A.F. 
  
Kumchang-
ri 
  A.F. might be nullified if situation 
too tense 
Launches ballistic missile in the 
Sea of Japan 
      To the U.S., war could be waged at 
any moment 
Four-Party 
Talks 
R4   U.S. and S.K. should not try to 
undermine peace talks, as could 
have serious consequences for 
peninsula 
Trilateral 
Talks 
  U.S. and Japan warns N.K. against 
escalation 
  
Six-Party 
Talks 
  Might freeze assets if no 
breakthrough 
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Fourth, “Actions” are perpetrated by parties, at the negotiations or aside from 
negotiations, and they can also influence the negotiations, either intentionally or unintentionally.  
 
 
  Rounds US NK 
Pilot 
Negotiation 
  Restriction of military flights over 
S.K. 
Calls off scheduled meeting in 
Panmunjon 
    Asks China and so forth to 
negotiate on behalf of U.S. 
Releases Hilemon's body 
    Acknowledges plane 
unintentionally strayed 
Refuses meeting at Panmunjon 
    Refuses to apologize Releases a picture of Hall 
    Restriction of military flights over 
S.K. 
Releases Hall's "confession" 
    White House sends letter of 
apology to N.K. 
Releases Hall 
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas 
Hubbard sent to Seoul 
  
    Members of Congress discuss 
sanctions and delaying oil 
shipments 
  
    A week later, U.S. sends more than 
50,000 tons of oil to North Korea 
  
Missile 
Talks 
R1   Cancels second round for technical 
reasons 
      Accepts proposal to get back to 
neg. table in June in N.Y. 
  Inter Takes in 2 N.K. diplomat defectors   
    U.S. refuses to give diplomats back   
  R3 Bill Clinton authorizes the use of 
$15 million for the purchase of 
heavy fuel for delivery to North 
Korea under the 1994 Agreed 
Framework 
  
  R4   N.K. deploys ballistic missiles that 
have range to hit Japan 
  Inter Will provide additional 50,000 tons 
of wheat to N.K. 
Extends ban on missile flight-
testing after easing of sanctions 
    U.S. eases sanctions on N.K. 
imports and exports 
  
Nodong   Mobilizes a reconnaissance aircraft 
to monitor Sea of Japan 
Missile activity: potential testing 
about to be done 
    Starts joint military drills with 
Japan 
Informs U.S. of its plan to launch 
missiles during talks in N.Y. (but 
this will stay secret until the end) 
      N.K. appears to stop missile-launch 
plans 
Kumchang-
ri 
  Sends delegation headed by Charles 
Kartman to visit the site 
  
Four-Party 
Talks 
    Stages a mock reaction to a 
chemical weapons attack 
    U.S. and Japan start military 
exercise 
  
 19 
  Inter   Refuses invitation from Perry 
Trilateral 
Talks 
    Broadcasts statement that it has 
nuclear weapons 
Six-Party 
Talks 
Inter   Will not talk to John Bolton 
  R2   Backs out of project because of 
S.K. nuclear double-standard 
 
 
1. Conditional Concessions 
 
 Conditional Concessions have been predominantly used by North Korea during rounds of 
negotiations, but also in-between rounds. In general, those Conditional Concessions reflect 
extortion. North Korea requests money and favors through this mechanism. One could infer that 
because North Korea did not use Conditional Concessions during the Pilot negotiations, 
Pyongyang was genuinely concerned about getting an apology from the United States. In five 
other negotiation episodes, Conditional Concessions have been related to food aid and money, as 
well as some higher-level politics issues such as Pyongyang abandoning its missiles in exchange 
for substitutes such as Russian satellites. North Korea’s request during the 1994-2000 period 
could be directly linked to its economic situation, and Pyongyang’s need for money and food in 
order to sustain itself.  
 
It appears that Conditional Concessions are not used when North Korea is seeking high-
level outcomes, such as an apology. However, the use of Conditional Concessions changed after 
the year 2000, with North Korea being more concerned with the issue of energy, as well as high-
politics issues, such as having respect for the fact that Kim Jong-Il’s regime is a sovereign 
regime. North Korea also diversified its sources of support via the usage of Conditional 
Concessions towards Japan. One example of such Conditional Concessions involved the requests 
for money in exchange for abductees’ release. As a general rule, Conditional Concessions are 
met with no similar proposals by the United States, which appears more gregarious when it 
comes to Stances. 
 
2. Stances 
 
 North Korea used stances especially in negotiation rounds where it was pushed towards a 
difficult situation by the United States’ usage of threats. North Korea used stances in the Pilot 
negotiation mainly to obtain an apology from Washington, but it used it more in multilateral 
negotiations, especially to delay the negotiation process. For North Korea, stances seem to be a 
defense mechanism whereas stances are more of an attack mechanism for the United States. For 
example, North Korea used stances during the Missile talks to keep the United States from 
publicizing talks, to avoid sanctions for something it did not do in the Kumchang-ri case, to get 
the U.S. to end sanctions and for technical reasons such as getting a delay in the start of the Four-
Party Talks for a few days or a few weeks.  
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It thus seems that North Korea uses stances when it is either not ready to have talks, or 
has internal problems related to talks, and when it wants the United States to not take a specific 
course of action. Finally, Stances have been used heavily during the Six-Party Talks, especially 
regarding issues that have been hurting North Korea’s pride, such as the Japanese occupation or 
topics related to its energy problem, therefore reinforcing the patterns of using stances as a 
defense mechanism, and not as a demand, as opposed to the United States. 
 
3. Threats 
 
Despite its label as an aggressive and rogue state, North Korea has used threats 
remarkably less than the United States. Most of the threats that the United States hinted at were 
linked to the Agreed Framework that was formulated before the Bush Administration cam to 
office. North Korea, however, used threats during the Kumchang-ri negotiations as well as 
during the Four-Party Talks, showing that it was not very comfortable with this forum.  
 
4. Actions 
 
 Actions have been used before, during, and after negotiation rounds. Most of North 
Korea’s actions involve a military structure of some sort, such as putting in place missiles for 
testing, or staging a mock reaction to a chemical weapons’ attack. Most of North Korea’s 
military actions, however, seem related to threats that were proffered by the United States, 
especially in the case of the bilateral missile negotiations. 
 
 
Ongoing foreign policy initiatives 
 
 The United States, be it under the Clinton Administration of the Bush Administration, has 
always managed to keep on interacting with North Korea, even though the Axis of Evil comment 
as well as Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons have hampered their relationship 
numerous times. The United States has thus maintained a dual foreign policy, one focused on 
multilateral diplomacy and commitment to the Six-Party process, and the other focused on semi-
direct relations with North Korea, with the American Congress cutting or reapproving aid to 
Pyongyang, as well as the United States bringing sanction calls to the United Nations Security 
Council.  
 
A content analysis of the United States foreign policy toward North Korea allows us to 
build a list of sanctions and rewards during both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations.  
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1. Sanctions 
 
 
 US 
1-Sep-98 Congress cuts funding for implementation of 1994 
agreement because of missile test and discovery of 
underground facility not covered by the 1994 agreement.  
14-Apr-00 US imposes new but largely symbolic sanctions on North 
Korean companies and the government for “knowingly 
engaging in export of military technology transfers” in 
violation of the MTCR 
Dec-01 President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea that they 
will be "held accountable if they develop WMDs "that 
will be used to terrorize nations" 
29-Jan-02 Bush characterizes North Korea as part of the "axis of 
evil" 
23-Aug-02 Bush Administration again imposes symbolic sanctions 
on North Korean companies and government for 
violating the MTCR and selling missile components to 
Yemen 
16-Oct-02 US calls on North Korea to comply with all its 
commitments under the NPT and suspends bilateral talks 
on improving economic and political ties.  
14-Nov-02 KEDO suspends heavy oil supplies to DPRK unless it 
abandons nuclear weapons program 
Dec-02 President Bush identifies North Korea as a key threat to 
the U.S. and its ally in a National Security Directive on 
missile defense. 
Apr-03 U.S. rejects North Korea's proposal to end its nuclear 
weapons program only after receiving U.S. concessions 
Apr-03 President Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-
Hyun vow not to "tolerate nuclear weapons in North 
Korea," and threaten "further steps" if North Korea 
continues its program 
Dec-03 All work on the nuclear power project in North Korea, 
promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework, is 
suspended for one year. 
19-Jan-05 Condoleezza Rice calls North Korea one of the "outposts 
of tyranny" 
Mar-05 Condoleezza Rice says efforts to persuade North Korea 
to give up nuclear program failed and Washington and 
the Int'l community will pursue "other ways" 
28-May-05 The United States suspends program to recover the 
remains of US soldiers killed in the Korean War. Move 
is perceived as a symbolic sanction in that it deprives the 
North Korean military of foreign exchange. The United 
States also cuts funding for personnel working on the 
light water nuclear reactor project 
13-Oct-05 The US Justice Department formally accuses North 
Korea of forging US currency.  
21-Oct-05 The US Treasury Department adds 8 North Korean 
entities to its list of sanctions against proliferators of 
weapons of mass destruction.  
Nov-05 U.S. employs financial restrictions against banks and 
 22 
North Korean companies for their alleged involvement in 
currency counterfeiting and other illicit activities. 
15-Jul-06 UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 
1695 which condemns North Korea's missile launches 
earlier in the month and demands it cease its ballistic 
missile activities. 
6-Oct-06 UN Security Council adopts a presidential statement 
expressing "deep concern" over North Korea's 
declaration that it will conduct a nuclear test. 
14-Oct-06 UN Security Council votes unanimously to impose 
sanctions on North Korea declaring its pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction are a "threat to international 
peace and security" 
 
 
2. Rewards 
 
 US 
20-Jan-95 Clinton Administration relaxes travel, communications, 
and some trade restrictions but leaves in place "about 99 
percent" of the sanctions under the Trading With the 
Enemy Act. 
1-Mar-99 US supplies 500,000 tons of food through the UN’s 
World Food Programme. 
17-Sep-99 President Clinton eases economic sanctions 
15-Dec-99 U.S.-led consortium signs a $4.6 billion contract for two 
Western-developed light-water nuclear reactors in 
DPRK. 
Mar-02 For first time, White House does not certify that North 
Korea is complying with its commitments under 1994 
agreement, but waives the certification for national 
security reasons and releases $95 million for KEDO 
25-Feb-03 Stating that recent suspension of food aid was not 
related to nuclear crisis, Powell announces that US will 
renew aid at reduced levels. 
18-Oct-04 Bush Administration decides to continue funding for 
KEDO but demands that construction of the LWRs be 
suspended. US provides only $3.72 million to KEDO 
for FY 2003 to cover administrative costs 
22-Jun-05 The United States announces donation of agricultural 
commodities to North Korea through the World Food 
Program.  
16-May-08 U.S. will restart food aid to North Korea 
 
 
 It is quite obvious that the use of sanctions and rewards by both the Clinton and the Bush 
Administration has been accomplished to different extents, and in order to face very different 
situations. During the Clinton Administration, rewards consisted of food as well as economic aid 
which North Korea in fact sometimes acknowledged through its mouthpiece, the Korean Central 
News Agency. As far as the Bush Administration is concerned, rewards consisted essentially of 
food given in exchange of relaxation over the nuclear crisis.  
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 As far as sanctions, there are not as many under the Clinton Administration, as part of the 
goal of the approach taken then was to embrace North Korea and coax it into slowly opening up, 
or at least prevent a hard-landing, shall the country collapse, by instead providing economic aid 
and development to the state. It is quite understandable, under this light that the Clinton 
Administration did not wish to sanction North Korea too harshly when it came to its nuclear 
program, as well as its lack of compliancy regarding the testing of missiles, for example. 
Sanctioning North Korea in the early years of the Agreed Framework could have thus sent the 
‘wrong message’ to Kim Jong Il. When looking at the Bush Administration, however, it is quite 
clear that Washington did not really intend to let North Korea get away with just about 
everything. Sanctions have been largely based on denuclearization and failure by North Korea to 
do so, and the United States has also called onto multilateral means by pressuring the 
international community, and especially the United Nations, to vote for an official sanctioning of 
some of Pyongyang’s illicit behaviors. This move is interesting, as it provides not only an insight 
into the way the United States has really embraced multilateral diplomacy, but also makes us 
wonder whether the United States would consider a potential strike against North Korea while it 
has garnered an international consensus on sanctioning North Korea, which thus differs from 
how the United States went about the war in Iraq.  
 
 North Korea’s reactions, however, have been mild at best. Sanctions have often been 
acknowledged and lengthily debated in the KCNA’s articles, and two themes have erupted over 
the years. First, the idea that the United States does not have the only prerogative on using force 
preemptively has been a major response of North Korea to Washington’s sanctions, especially 
when those followed sticks linked to denuclearization. Second, North Korea has stressed its right 
to develop nuclear weapons for security, and has often referred to the United Nations charter to 
strengthen its position. It has also maintained its right to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
to create its own nuclear deterrent in light of the United States’ foreign policy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The United States foreign policy toward North Korea has largely been composed of 
sanctions and rewards, as well as, especially during the Bush years, a propensity to use 
multilateral diplomacy. It should not be understood, however, that the policy had become more 
flexible or more accommodating. What seems to have appeared is that the United States has had 
a hard time crafting a policy that would encompass North Korea’s rogue state status.  
 
During the Clinton Administration, the concept of rogue state was already relevant but 
effort to create the Agreed Framework and stick to its terms probably hampered the United 
States from becoming too vehement against Pyongyang. At the same time, North Korea was also 
suffering from devastating floods and was on the brink of collapse because of famine and very 
poor economic conditions. During the Bush Administration, however, North Korea has managed 
to continue developing nuclear weapons, has tested them while withdrawing from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and has also kept on being an integral actor in the Six-Party talks while 
having been singled out by Washington as a rogue state, an axis of evil, or an outpost of tyranny, 
for example. 
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Given the fact that sanctions and rewards have been utilized both in the past, and that 
North Korea still appears to have maintained a relative freedom regarding the building and 
testing of nuclear weapons, one can truly wonder about the effectiveness of sanctions to impede 
the regime economically, as well as the impact of rewards that are supposedly changing the 
regime and helping it to become more trusting of the world, and more integrated into the 
international community.  
 
As such, one can wonder if North Korea’s rogue status is not setting a precedent in the 
relationship between Washington and Pyongyang, as every overture that the United States would 
do is still tainted by the pre-existing fact that Washington does not consider Pyongyang as a 
‘normal’ state but as a suspicious and dangerous one to begin with.  
 
The same can be said about the relationship governing both countries, historically-
speaking. Perhaps a smart move for Washington would be to stop labeling North Korea a rogue 
state, and accept a truce by signing a non-aggression treaty with North Korea. Of course, this 
could be seen as a failure and a dangerous move for the United States, but it is what North Korea 
has been vehemently asking for over many years. At the same time, giving this security 
guarantee would undermine North Korea’s only reason for developing weapons of mass 
destruction and for being verbally aggressive toward the United States. As such, North Korea’s 
very demand, the signature of a non-aggression treaty with Washington, could very-well be its 
own undoing: Pyongyang would no longer be able to polarize its citizens because there would 
not be the great threat of war with the United States anymore, hence weakening the regime from 
within.  
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